It all began with a bad smell. A little before 4 PM on January 17, 1992, the ominous smell of natural gas filled the apartments and businesses of River West, just east of the Kennedy and west of the river. Next came hissing noises from stoves and space heaters. In one home a pilot light shot up three feet. As people stumbled out into the dusk, the buildings along Racine started blowing up.
Mayor Daley got into a row with the media because he didn’t visit River West during the cleanup. He said such visits were just for show. In truth, neither he nor anyone else had much to show Chicagoans. In the days that followed, the City Council and state legislature held hearings, the Illinois Commerce Commission made reassuring noises, the National Transportation Safety Board came to investigate (gas pipelines are “transportation”). But nobody could say why the gas surge had hit River West. And nobody knew if it could happen again.
Medium-pressure systems are cheaper because they use smaller pipes to carry the same amount of gas. Peoples Gas has been gradually converting Chicago to medium pressure, though it insists it’s doing so only for reasons of economy, not safety. Nevertheless, in areas served by medium pressure, a single accident can no longer introduce medium-pressure gas into the homes of an entire neighborhood, as may have happened in River West. Peoples Gas plans to have the whole city converted by 2033.
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If they did, it might not have been fatal if it weren’t for the fact that River West had an unusually small, isolated gas-distribution system. Most neighborhoods tie into a huge network of pipes with dozens of regulators. But like portions of Hegewisch, Hyde Park, and Near Norridge, River West was a relatively small area, served by only two regulator stations and cut off from the rest of the distribution system. It seems reasonable that excess gas pressure could have caused more damage in River West than elsewhere, simply because the neighborhood had fewer miles of pipe to disperse the buildup and fewer appliances to burn it off. Had the company made a mistake by not converting these cut-off neighborhoods to medium pressure?
On February 28, 1992, six weeks after the accident, Cook County state’s attorney Jack O’Malley put these questions to the Illinois Commerce Commission. He asked the ICC to investigate both Peoples Gas’s regulator-overhaul procedures and the safety of cut-off neighborhoods.
In 1982 the coalition published a report, based on public data from the company, claiming that the utility’s gas-distribution pipes were unusually leaky and that it had more accidents than other gas utilities–evidence that maintenance was being neglected. In a 1986 update prepared for the Illinois attorney general’s office, the coalition reaffirmed its contention that “Peoples Gas has not had a history of replacing its infrastructure at a responsible rate.”
That is indeed what Rosen says, and she may have a point. The ICC’s conflict-of-interest follies, most recently the White Sox tickets affair, are notorious. Certainly its endless delays in deciding simply whether to hold a public investigation of River West as the state’s attorney asked have served to favor Peoples Gas, as damage suits against the company are settled and public interest in River West fades. From the beginning Peoples Gas and the ICC staff have agreed: first, that there should be no investigation of River West beyond the one conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board; second, that if there must be another investigation, it should be conducted privately, not in public; and third, that either way there’s no hurry.
